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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

5 Ex. Doc.

l

No. 5.

SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

LETTER
TROM

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
TRANSm'ITI:sO,

In answer to a resolution of the House of the 12th in1;tant, an opinion
relative to the su.9pension of the writ of habeas corpus.
JULY 13, 18Gl.-Rcferred to the Committee on the Judiciary, nnd ordered to be plinted.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, July 13, 1861.
Srn: In obedience to a resolution of the House passed yesterday,
and by permission of the President, I have the honor to send herewith a copy of my opinion "mentioned in the message of the President delivered to this House at the opening of its present session."
The resolution also requests of me "a copy of the order suspending
the writ of habeas corpus." As there is no such order in the records
or the files of my office, I have.ventured to request the Secretary of
State to fulfil the pleasure of the honorable House in that particular.
I have the honor to be, most respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,
EDWARD BATES.

The Hon. the

SPEAKER

of ilie House of Representatives.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, July 5, 1861.
Sm: You have required my opinion in writing upon the following
ouestions:
,. 1. In the present time of a great anu dangerous insurrection, has
the President the discretionary power to cause to be arrested and held
in cnstody persons known to have criminal intercourse with the insurgents, or }Jersons against whom there is probable cause for suspicion
of such criminal com1)licity?
2. In such cases of arrest, is the President justified in refusing to
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obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by a court or a judge, rer1uiring
him or his agent to produce the body of the prisoner, and show the
cause of his caption and detention, to be adjudgerl and dispose(l of by
such court or judge?
To make my answer to these questions at once consistent ancl plain,
I .find it convenient to advert to the great principle of government as
recognized and acted upon in most, if not all, the countries in Europe,
and to mark the difference between that principle and tho great principle which lies at the bottom of om national government.
l\Iost European writers upon goYCrnment assume, expressly or by
implication, that every national government is, and must be, the full
expression and representation of the nation which it governs, armed
with all it powers and able to assert all its rights. In England, the
form of whose government more nearly approximates our own, and
where the rights, interests, and powers of tne people are more respeded
and cared for than in most of the ntitions of the European continent,
it has grown into an axiom that" The Parliament is omnipotent,"
that is, that it can do anything that is possible to be done by legislation or by judgment. For all the ·ends of government, the Parliament is the nation. Moreover, in Europe generally, the sovereignty
is vested visibly in some designated man or set of men, so that the
subject people can see their sovereign as well as feel the workings of
his power. But in this country it has been carefully provided otherwise. In the formation of our national government, our fathers were
surrounded with peculiar difficulties arising 0~1t of their novel, I may
say unexampled, condition. In resolving to break the ties which had
bound them to the British Empire, their complaints were levelled
chiefly at the King, not the Parliament nor the people. They seem
to have been actuated by a special dread of the unity of power, and
hence, in framing the Constitution, they preferred to take the risk of
leaving some good undone, for lack of power in the agent, rather than
arm any government officer with such great powers for evil as are
implied in the dictatorial charge to "see that no damage comes to the
Commonwealth.''
Hence, keeping the sovereignty always out uf sight, they adopted
the plan of "checks and balances," forming separate departments of
government, and giving to each department separate and limitetl
powers. These departments are co-ordinate and coequal-that is,
neither being sovereign, each is indepenJent in its sphere, and not
subordinate to the others, either of them or both of them together.
vVe have three of these co-ordinate departments. Now, if we allow
one of the three to determine the extent of its own powers, and also
the extent of the powers of the other two, that one can control the
whole government, and has in fact achieved the sovereignty.
"\Ve ought not to say that our system is perfect, for its defects (perhaps inevitable in all human things) are obvious. Our fathers,
having divided the government into co-ordinate departments, did not
even try (and if they had triecl woul(l probably have failed) to create
an arbiter among them to adjudge their conflicts and keep them within
their respective bounds. They were left, by design, I suppose, each
independent and free, to act out its own granted powers, without any
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ordained legal superior professing the power to revise and reverse its
action. And this with the hope that the three departments, mutually
coequal and independent, would keep each other within their proper
spheres by their mutual antagonism--that is, by the system of checks
and balances to which our fathers were driven at the beginning by
their fear of the unity of power.
In this view of the subject it is q nitc possible for the same identical
question (not case) to come up legitimately before each one of the three
departments, and be determined in three different ways, and each decision stand irreYocable, binding upon the parties to each case ; and
that, for the simple reason that the departments are co-ordinate, and
there is no ordained legal superior with power to revise and reverse
their decisions.
To say that the departments of our government are co-ordinate is to
say that the judgment of one of them is not binding upon the other
two, as to the arguments and principles involved in the judgment. It
binds only the parties to the case decided. But if, admitting that
the departments of government are co-ordinate, it be still contended
that the principles adopted by one department, in deciding a case
properly before it, are binding upon another department, that obligation must of necessity be reciprocal-that is, if the President be
1)ound by the principles laid down by the judiciary, so also is the
judiciary bonnd by the principles laid <lown by the President. And
thus we shall have a theory of constitutional government flatly contradicting itself. Departments co-ordinate and coequal, and yet reciprocally subordinale to each other? That cannot be. The several departments, though far from sovereign, are free antl independent, in
the exercise of tlie limited powers granted to them respectively by the
Constitution. Our government indeed, as a whole, is not vested with
the sovereignty, and does not possess all the powers of the nation. It
has no powers but such as are grantetl by the Constitution; and many
powers are expressly withheld. The nation certainly is coequal with
all other nations, and has equal powers, but it has not chosen to delegate all its powers to this government, in any or all of its departments.
The government, as a whole, is lin1ited, and limited in all its departments. It is the especial function of the judiciary to hear and
determine cases, not to" estabJish principles" nor" settle questions,"
so as to conclude any person, but the parties and privies to the cases
adjudged. Its powers are specially granted and defined by the Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2.
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and e<]_uity
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the Unitetl States, and
treaties made, and which shall be made, under their authority ; to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other ministers, and consuls; to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more
States; between States aml citizens of other States; between citizens
of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands
under grants of different States, and bet.veen a State, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." And that is the
sum of its 1>owers, ample and efficient for all the purposes of distribu-
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tivc justice among individual parties, but powerless to impoRe rules of
action and of judgment upon the other departments. Indeed, it is
not itself bound by its own decisions, for it can and often docs overrule and disregard them, as, in common honesty, it ought to do
whenever it :finds, by its after and better lights, that its former
judgments were wrong.
Of all the departments of the government, the President is the
most active, and the moet constant in action. Re is called "tho Executive," and so, in fact, be is, and much more also, for the Constitution has imposed upon him many important duties, and grantecl to
him great powers which are in their nature not executive-such as the
veto power; the power to send and receive ambassadors; the power
to make treaties, and the power to appoint officers. This last is not
more an executive power when used by the President than it is when
exercised by either house of Congress, by the courts of justice, or by
the people at large.
The President is a department of the government; and, although
the only department which consists of a single man, he is charged
with a greater range and variety of powers and duties than any other
department. Ile is a civil magiBtrale, not a milila1·y chief; and in this
regard we see a striking proof of the generality of the sentiment prevailing in this country at the time of the formation of our government, to the effect that the military ought to be held in strict subordination to the civil power. For the Constitution, while it grants to
Congress t.he unrestricted power to declare war, to raise and support
armies, and to provide and maintain a navy, at the same time guards
carefully against the abuse of that power, by withholding from Congress and from the army itself the authority to appoint the chief commander of a force so potent for good or for evil to the State. The
Constitution provides that "the President shall be cornmander-inchief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of
the several States when called into the actual service of the United
States." And why is this? Surely not because the President is supposed to be, or commonly is, in fact, a military man, a man skilled in
the art of war and qualified to marshal a host iP- the field of battle.
No, it is for quite a different reason; it is that whatever skilful soldier
may lead our armies to victory against a foreign. foe, or may quell a
domestic insurrection; however high he may raise his professional renown, and whatever martial glory he may win, still be is subject to
the orders of the civil magish·ate, and he and his army are always
"subordinate to the civil power."
And hence it follows, that whenever the President, (the civil magiBtrnte,) in the discharge of his constitutional duty to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed," has occasion to use the army to aid him
in the performance of that duty, he does not thereby lose his civil character and become a soldier, subject to military law and liable to be tried
by a court-martial, any more than does a civil court lose its legal and
pacific nature and become military and belligerent, by calling out the
power of the country to enforce its decrees. The civil magistrates,
whether judicial or executive, must of necessity employ physical power
to aid them in enforcing the laws whenever they have to deal with
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disobedient and refractory subjects; and their legal power and right
to do so is unquestionable. The right of the courts to call out the whole
power of the country to enforce their judgments is as old as the common law; and the right of the President to use force in the performance of his legal duties is not only inherent in his office, but has been
frequently recognized and aided by Congress. One striking example
of this is the act of Congress of l\Iarch 3, 1807, (2 Stat., ,1 45,) which
empowered the President, without the intervention of any court, to
use the marshal, and, if he be insufficient, to use the army, summaily to expel intruders and sc1uatters upon the public lands. And
that power bas been frequently exercised, without, as far as I know,
a question of its legality. To call, as is sometimes done, the judiciary
the civil power, and the President the military power, seems to me at
once a mistake of fact and an abuse of language.
\Vhile the jur.liciary and the President, as departments of the general government, are co-ordinate, equal in dignity and power, and
equally trusted by the law, in their respective spheres, there is, nevertheless, a markeu diversity in tte character of their functions and
their modes of action. The judiciary is, for the most part, passive.
It rarely, if ever, takes the initiative; it seldom or never begins an
operation. Its great function is judgment, and, in the exercise of that
function, it is confined almost exclusively to cases not selected by
itself, but made and submitted by others. The President, on the contrary, by the \rery nature of his office, is active; he must often take
the initiative; be must begin orerations. His great function is execution, for he is required by the Constitution, (anu he is the only department that is so required,) to "take care that the laws (all the
laws) be faithfully executed;" and in the exercise of that function,
his duties are coextensive with the laws of the land.
Often he comes to the aid of the judiciary in tbe execution of its
judgments; and this is only a riart, and a small part, of his constitutional duty, to take care that t.he laws be faithfully executed. I say
it is a small part of his duty, because for every instance in which the
PresiJent executes the judgment of a court, there are a hundred instances in which he executes the law without the intervention of the
judiciary, and without referring at all to its functions.
I have premised this much in order to show the separate and indepenuent character of the severnl departments of our government, and
to indicate the inevitable differences in their modes of action, and the
characteristic diversity of the subjects upon which they operate; and
all this as a foundation for the answers which I will now proceed to
give to the particular 11uestions propoumled to me.
As to the first question : I am clearly of opinion that, in a time
like the present, when the very exi,:tence of the nation is assailed by
a great ancl dangerous insurrection, the President has the lawful discretionary 1>ower to arrest and hold in custody persons known to have
criminal intercourse with the insurgents, or persons against whom
there is probable cause for suspicion of such criminal complicity. And
I think this position can be maintained, in view of the principles already laid down, by a very plain argument.
The Constitution requires the President, before he enters upon the
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execution of his office, to take an oath thathe "will faithfully execute
the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of
his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States.''
The duties of the office comprehend all the executive power· of the
nation, which is expressly vested in the President by the Constitution,
article 2, sec. 1, and also all the powers which are specially delegated
to the President, and yet are not in their nature executive powers.
For example, the veto power ; the treaty making power; the appointing power; the pardoning power. These belong to that class which,
in England, are called prerogative powers, inherent in the crown.
And yet the framers of our Constitution thought proper to preserve
them, and to vest them in the President, as necessary to the good
government of the country. The executive powers are granted generally, and without specification ; the powers not executi\•e are granted
specially, and for purposes obvious in the context of the Constitution.
And all these are embracecl within the duties of the President, and
are clearly within that clause of his oath which requires him to
"faithfully execute the office of President.."
'rhe last clause of the oath is peculiar to the President. All the
other officers of government are required to swear only " to support
this Constitution," while the President must swear to "p1·eserve,
protect, and defend" it, which implies the power to perform what he
is required in so solemn a manner to undertake. And then follows
the broad and compendious injunction to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." And this injunction, embracing as it does all
the laws-Constitution, treaties, statutes-is addressed to the President alone, and not to any other department or officer of the government. And this constitutes him, in a pecnliar manner, and above all
other officers, the guardian of the Constitution- its preserver, protector, and defender.
It is the plain duty of the President (and his pet-nliar duty, above
and beyond all other departments of the government,) to preserve the
Constitution and execute the laws all over the nation ; and it is
plainly impossible for him to perform this duty without putting down
rebellion, insurrection, and all unlawfnl combinations to resist the
general government. The duty to suppress the insurrection being
obvious an(l imperative, the two acts of Congress of I 795 and 180'7
come to his aid, and furnish the physical force which he needs to suppress the insurrection aml execute the laws. These two acts authorize the President to employ for that purpose, the militia, the army,
and the navy.
The argument may be briefly stated, thus: It is the President's
bounden duty to put down the insurrection, as (in the language of
the act of 1795) the "combinations are too powerful to be suppressed
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested
in the marshals." And this duty is imposed upon the President for
the very reason that the courts anJ the marshals are too weak to perform it. The manner in which he shall perform that duty is not
prescribed by any law, but the means of performing it are given i n
the plain language of the statutes, and they are all means of force-
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the militia, the army, and the navy. The end, the suppression of
the insurrection, is required of him; the means ancl instruments to
suppress it are lawfully in his ban<ls; but the manner in which he
shall use them is not prescribed, and could not be prescribed without
a foreknowledge of all the future changes and contingencies of the insurrection. He is, therefore, necessarily thrown upon his discretion, as
to the manner in which he will use his means to meet the varying
exigenc~es as they arise. If the insurgents assail the nation with an
a.rmy, be may nnd it best to meet them with an army, and suppress
the insurrection in the field of battle. If they seek to prolong the
rebellion and gather strength by intercourse with foreign nations, he
may choose to gua.rd the coasts and close the ports with a navy, as
one of the most efficient means to suppress the insurrection. And if
they employ spies and emissaries, to gather information, to forward
secret supplies, and to excite new insurrections in aid of the original
rebellion, he may fincl it bot,h prudent and humane to arrest and imprison them. And this may be done either for the purpose of bringing them to trial and condign punishment for their crimes, or they
may be held in custody for the milder end of rendering them powerless for mi~chief until the exigency is past.
In such a state of things the President must of necessity be the sole
judge, both of the exigency which requires him to act, and of the
manner in which it is most prudent for him to employ the powers intrusted to him, to enable him to discharge his constitutional and legal
duty-that is, to suppress the insurrection and execute the laws. And
this discretionary power of the President is folly admitted by the
Supreme Court, in the case of l\Iartin 1·8. Mott.-(12 Wheaton's Reports, page H) ; 7 Curtis, 10.)
This is a great power in the hands of the chief magistrate ; and
because it is great, and is capable of being perverted to evil ends, its
existence has been doubted or denied. It is said to be dangerous in
the hands of an ambitious and wicked President, because he may use
it for t~1e purpo~es of oppression and tyranny. Yes, certainly, it is
dangerous-all power is dangerous-and for the all-perYading reason
that all power is liable to abuse; all foe recipients of human power
are men, not absolutely virtuous and wise. Still it is a, power necessary to the peace and safety of the country, and undeniably belongs
to the government, antl therefore must be exerciseJ by sot11e department or ofilcer thereof.
\Vhy should this power be tlenied to the President, on the ground
of its liability to abuse, and not denied to the other departments on
the same grounds? Arc they more exempt than he is from the frailties and vices of hnmanity? Or are they more trusted by the law
than he is trusted in their several spheres of action? If it be
said that a President may be awbitious and unscrupulous, it may be
said with equal truth that a legislature may be factious and unprincipled, and a court may be venal and corrupt. Dut these arc crimes
neve1· to be presumed, even against a pri,·ate man, and much less
against any high and highly-trusted public functionary. They are
crimes, however, recognized as such, and made punisliab1e by the
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Constitution, and whoever is guilty of them, whether a President, a
senator. or 1i judge, i;; liable to impeachment an<l condemnation.
As to the second question:
Having assumed, iu answering the first question, that the President ha!! the legal discretionary power to arrest and imprison per80ns
who are gnilty of hol<ling criminal intercourse with men engaged in
a great and dangerous insurrection, or persons suspected, with
'' probable cause," of such criminal complicity, it might seem unnecessary to go into e.ny prolonged argnment to 11rove that, in such a
cai;e, the President is fully jm;tified in refusing to obey a writ of
lia/Jeas corpus issued by a. court or jmlge, commanding him to produce
the bo<ly of l1is prisoner, and state when he took him, and by what
authority, and for what cause he detains him in custody, and then
yield himself to judgment "to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever
the judge or court awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."
If it be true, as I have assumed, that the President ancrthe judiciary
are co-ordinate departments of government, and the one not 1mborclinate lo the other, I do uot understand how it can be legally
1iossible for a jt1dge to issue a command to the President to come
before him acl suldicic1,dum-tl1at is, to 1mbmit iwplicitly to his ju<lgmeut, and, in case of disobedience, treat him ll!i a criminal, in contempt of a superior authority, and punish him, ai; for a. misdemeanor,
by fine and imprisonment. It is no answer to 1my, as has sometirnl'S
been saicl, that although the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued and
enforced against the President himself, yet that it can be against any
of his subordinates, for that abandons the principle assumed of giving
relief in "all cases" of imprisonment hy color of authority of the
United States, and attempts to take an uuten!tble distinction between
the person ot the Presideut ancl his office ancl legal power. The
law takes no such clii;tinction, for it is no respecter of persons. The
President, in the arrest and imprisonment of men, must, almost
always, act by subordinate agents, and yet the thing done is no le1,s
his act than if done by his own han1l. Bnt it is pos~ible for the
President to be in the actual custody of ti prisoner tiiken in civil war, or
arrested on suspicion of being n. 1,ecret agent and abettor of rebellion,
an<l in that case the writ mu),t be unavailing unless it run against
the President himself'. Be~itlcs, the whole subject-matter is political
and not judicial. 'rhe insurrection it~elf is purely political. Its
object is to destroy the political government of this nation and to
establish another 1,olitical go\·ernment upon its ruin;;. And the
Prtsident, a~ the chief civil magistrntc of the uation, ancl the most
active department of the gov<'rnment, is eminently antl exclusively
political in all his principal fnoctions. As the political chief of the
nation, the Uonstitution chnrges him with its preservation, protection, and clcfonce, untl 1eqnires him to take care that tl1e Jaws be
faithfully executed. And in tlrnt character, and by the aid of lhe
acts of Congress of 11!15 arnl 1807, he wages open war against armed
rebellion, 11ml arre:;ts and holds in l'll~tody those whom, in the exerci ~e of his political cliscretio11, he believes to be friends ol', and accomplices in, the armed insurrection, which it i~ hiR especial political
duty to suppress. lle has no judicial powers. And the jndicinry
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department has no political powers and claims none, and therefore
(as well as for other reasons already assigned) no court or judge can
take cognizance of the political acts of the President, or undertake to
revise and reverse bis political decisions.
The jurisdiction exercised under the writ of habeas corpus is in the
nature of an appeal, ( 4 C., 75 ,) for as far as concerns tbe right of the
prisoner, the whole object of the process is to re-examine and reverse
or affirm the acts of the person who imprisoned him. And I think
it will hardly be seriously affirmell that a ,indge, at chambers, can
entertain an appeal, in any form, from a decision of the President of
the United States, and especially in a case purely political.
There is but one sentence in the Constitution which mentions the
writ of !talieas corpus-article 1, section 9, clause 2-which is in these
words : " The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or in\"'asion, the public
safety may require it.''
Very learned persons have differed widely about the meaning of
this short sentence, and I am by no means confiJent that I fully understand it myself. The sententious language of the Constitution,
in this particular, must, I suppose, be intervreted with reference
to the origrn of our people, their historical relations to the mother
country, and their inchoate political condition at the moment
when our Constitution was formed. At that time the United States
as a nation, had no common law of its own, and no statutory provision for the writ of habeas corpus. Still, the people, English by
descent, even while in open rebellion against the English crown,
claimed a sort of historical right to the forms of English litw, and
the guarantees of English freedom. They knew that ihe English
government had, more than once, assumed the power to imprison
whom it would, and hold them for an indefinite time beyond the reach
of judicial examination ; and they desired, no doubt, to interpose a
guard against the like abuses in this country. And Lenee the clause
of the Constitution now under consideration. But we must try to
construe the words, vague and undeterminate as they are, as we find
them. "'rhe privilege of the writ of habeas cm·pus shall not be suspended," &c. Does that mean that the writ itself shall not be issued,
or, that being issued, the party shall derive no benefit from it? Su.spencled-does that mean delayed, hung up for a time, or altogether
denietl? Tlte writ of habeas corpus-which writ? In England there
were wany writs called by that name, and nsetl by the courts for the
more convenient exercise of their various powers; ancl our own courts
now, by acts of Congress, the judiciary act of 1780, section 14, and
the act of _\larch 2, 1833, section 7, have, I believe, ec1uiYalent powers.
It has been decided by the ~upreme Court, aud I doubt not col'l'ectly,
see Bollman Swartwort's case, (4 C., 93,) that" for the meaning of
the term habeas corpu.s, resort must be had to the common law, but
tbe power to award the writ, by any of the courts of the United States,
must be given by written law." And the same high court (judging,
no doubt, by the history ot om· people and the circumstances of the
times) has also decided that the writ of habeas corpus, mentioned in
the Constitution, is the great writ acl subjicienclum.
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That writ, in its nature, Rction, and objects, is tersely and accurately described hy Sir William Blackstone. I adopt his language,
as found in his Commentaries, book 3, p. 131. "Bnt the great and
efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas
corpus ad subJiciendmn, directed to the person detaining another and
commandinO' him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day
and cause of his caption anu detention, adfaciendum, suldicie.ndurn et
rccipiendurn, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or
court awarding such writ shall consider in that behalf. 'l'his is a
high prerogative writ, and ther~fore by the common law, issuing out
of the court cf king· s bench, not, only in term time, but also during
the vacation, by a fiat from the chief justice or any other of the
judges, and running into all parts of the King's dominions; for the
King is at all times entitled to have an account why the liberty of
any of his subjects is restrained, where,,er that restraint may be inflicted."
Such is the writ. of habeas corpus of which the C()n11titution declares
that the privilege thereof shall not be suspeu<led, exce1it when, in
cas~s of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. But
the Constitution is silent as to who may suspend it when the contingency happens. I am aware that it has been declarecl by the
Sn1)reme Court that "if, at any time, the public safet.v shoulcl
require the suspension of the powers veste<l by this act [u1ea11iug
the judiciary act of 1789, section 14] in the courts of the United
States, 1t 1s for the legislature to 1-ay so. 'l'hat quei;tion depeuds
upon political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide."
Upon this, I remark only that the Constitution i.s olller than the
judiciary act, ancl yet it !ipeaks of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus as a thing in existence; it is in general terms, and
does not speak with particular reference to powers which might or
might not be granted hy a future act of Congress. Besides, I take it
for certain that in the common conrse of legislation, CongreRs lias
power, at any time, to repeal the judiciary act of 178!) and tho act of
1833 (which grants to the courts aud to the ju<lges the power to it11rne
writs) withont waiting for a rebellion or invasion, and a consequent
public necessity, to justify, under the Constitl1tion, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas coipns. 'l'he court <loes not speak
of suspending the privilege of the writ, but of" suspen1ling the powers
vested in the court by the act. 'l'hc power to issue a writ can hardly
be called a privilege, yet the right of an individual to invoke the
protection ot his government in that form may well be designateLl by
that name. And I s!tould infer, with a guou deal of confidence, that
the court meant to speak ooiy of its own powNs, a11<l not of the
privilege of inclivitluala, but for the fact that the Cllttrt ascribes the
powers tu snsptnd to the legislature 11pon pol?'lical yrouncl8, It. says,
·' that qu€slion depend 1, uprm political considerations, ou which the
legislature is to decide." Now, I had i,nppose<l that. 'Jl:c.>:,,tions Llill
not belong excliu-ivcly to the legislature, becau~e they depend upon political con~id<:ru.tious, inasmuch ns the l're:,ideut, iu l1il'! co11,,fr utioual
and ofHcial duties, is <1uite as political a:s .is tlie Cuugrc~s, aud l1as
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daily occasion in tbe common routine of affairs to determine questions upon political considerations alone.
If by the phrase the suspension of the privilege of the writ of ltabeas
corpus, we must understand a repeal of all power to issue the ,vrit,
then I freely admit that none but Congress can do it. But if we are
at liberty to understand the phrase to mean that, in case of a great
and dangerous rebellion, like the present, the public safety requires
the arrest and confinement of persons implicated in that rebellion, I
as freely declare the opinion that the President has lawful power to
s1t8pend the privilege of persons arrested under such circumstances.
For he is especially charged by the Constitution with the "public
safety," and he is the sole judge of the emergency which requires his
prompt action.
'rhis power in the President is no part of his ordinary duty in time
of peace; it i:'I temporary and exceptional, antl was intended only to
meet a pressing emergency, when the judiciary is found to be too
weak to insure the public safety; when (in the language of the act
of Congress) there are "combinations too powerful to be suppressed
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested
in the marshn.ls." Then, and not till then, has he the lawful authority to call to his aid the military power of the nation, and with that
power perform his great legal and constitutional duty to auppress the
insurrection. And shall it be said that when he has fought and captured the insurgent army, and has seized their secret spies and emissaries, he is bound to bring their bodies before any ,judge who may
send him a writ of habeas corpus, "to do, submit to and receive whatsoever the said judge shall consider iu that behalf?"
I deny that he is under any obligation to obey such a writ, issued
under such ci1cumstances. And in making this denial, I clo but follow the highest judicial authority of the nation. In case of Luther
vs. Borden, (commonly called the Rhode Island case,) reported in 7'
Howard, page l, the Supreme Court discussed severnl of the most
important topics treated of in this opinion, and among them the
power of the President alone to decide whether the exigency exists
authorizing him to call out the militia, under the act of 1795. 'l'he
court affirmed the power of the President in that respect, and denied
the power of the comt to examine and adjudge his proceedings. The
opinion of the court, delivered by the learned Chief Justice Taney,
declares that if the court hacl that power, "then it would become the
duty of the court (provided that it came to the conclusion that the
President had decided incorrectly) to discharge those who were arrested or detained by the troops in the service of the United 8tates 1
or tlie government which the President was endeavoring to maintain.
If (says that learned court) the judicial power extends so far, the
guarantee contained in the Constitution of the United States (meaning, of course, protection against iosnrrection) is a guarantee of
anarchy and not or order:·
vVhatever l have said about the f;Uspension of the privilege of the
writ of haheas corpus, has been said in deference to the opinions of
others, and not because I myself thought it nece:;sary to treat of that
subject at all in reference to the present posture of our national affairs.
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For, not doubting tl1e power of the President to capture and hold by
force insurgents in open arms against the government, and to arrest
and imprison their suspected accomplices, I never thought of first
suspending the writ of ltabecis co1pus any more than I thought of first
suspending the writ of rezJlevin before seizing a.rms and munitions
destined for the enemy.
The power to do these things is in the hand of the President, placccl
there by the Constitution and the statute law, as a sacred trust, to be
used by him, in his best discretion, in the performance of his great
:first duty-to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitatiou. Auel
for any breach of that trust he is responsible before the high court of
impeachment, and before no other human tribunal.
The powers of the President falling within this general class have
been several times considered by the judiciary, and have, I believe,
been uniformly sustained, without materially varying from the doctrines laid clown in this opinion. I content myself with a simple
reference to the cases without encumbering this uocument, already
too long~ with copious extl'acts.-(The Rhode Island case, 7 Howard,
page 1; .Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, page 615; Cross vs. Harrison,
16 Howard, page 189; the Santissima 'rrinidad, 7 ·wheaton, page
305; :Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheaton, page 29.)
To my mincl it is not very importa,nt whether we call a particular
power exercised by the President a peace power or a war power, for,
undoubtedly, he is armetl with both. He is the chief civil magistrate
of the nation, and being such, and because he is such, he is the constitutional comma11der-in-chief of the army and navy; and thus,
within the limits of the Constitution, he rules in peace and commands
in war, and at this moment he is in the full exercise of all the functions belonging to both those characters. The civil administration is
still going on in its peaceful cJurse, and yet we are in the midst of
war, a war in which the enemy is, for the present, dominant in many
States, and has his secret allies and accomplices scattered through
many other States which are still loyal ancl true. A war·all the moro
dangerous, and more nl'eding jealous vigilance and prompt action,
because it is an internecine and not an international war.
This, sir, is my opinion, the result of my l.Jest reflections, upon the
questions propounded by you. Such as it is, it is submitted, with all
possible respect, hy your obedient servant,
·
EDWARD BATES,
A!tomey General.

